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Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between the selected measures
of competition and the actual intensity of the interaction in the product
market under the presence of market frictions. The rst part of the study
compares the industry-level price-cost margin and prot elasticity within
a model of monopolistic competition where the degree of substitutability
among the product varieties is the determinant of the level of rm-to-rm
interaction. The second part studies the empirical performances of the
indices through a panel of manufacturing rms operating in Ukraine dur-
ing 2004-2007. Particular attention is devoted on the method of the prot
elasticity. However, this paper deviates from the literature by developing
an alternative approach to measure the elasticity of prots to productivity
that relies on the structural estimation of the industry production func-
tions. The estimation methodology takes into account the unobservable
prices at the rm level by introducing the demand side, and retrieves elas-
ticity of substitution estimates jointly with the TFP. The ndings imply
that while the proposed method provides a robust measure, the price-cost
margin and the traditional prot elasticity fail to indicate the true level of
competition especially when the intensity of interaction among the rms
is relatively low.
1 Introduction
The impact of competition on the market dynamics has been a long interest
in the elds of economic growth and development. Particular attention is de-
voted to the e¤ect of competition on the rmsproductivity performances and
the driving forces of productivity such as the technology-innovative and adap-
tive activities. However, while various competition-enhancing policies have been
implemented or take a primary place in the agenda of todays economic author-
ities with the main or secondary aim of accelerating the productivity growth,
the empirical ndings on the link between competition and productivity are still
limited and ambiguous.
I am grateful to Eric J. Bartelsman, Evgenia Motchenkova and Zoltan Wolf for valuable
comments and discussions.
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Competition may a¤ect productivity through the dynamic and static chan-
nels where the dynamic one may motivate or demotivate production units to
innovate or adopt more advanced technologies into the production process. In
other words, the dynamic e¤ects of competition play a role in the determination
of the level of the (technological) production frontier, where this often happens
through the innovation in the most advanced economies and the adaptation of
new technologies in the developing countries.
On the other hand, competition can also alter the productivity performance
of an industry by enhancing the e¢ ciency in the allocation of production factors.
Namely, more intense interaction among the production units may induce the
accumulation of the production factors in the most productive establishments,
which increases the aggregate productivity of the industry without a¤ecting the
idiosyncratic productivity levels. If the possible exit of ine¢ cient units and the
entry of potentially more productive ones due to more intense competition are
further taken into account, the static e¤ects of competition through the factor
allocation can signicantly alter the productivity performance of an industry.
Moreover, although the productivity enhancing e¤ect of the more e¢ cient factor
allocation may be expected to be higher in the developing countries, Bartels-
man et al. (2009) show that there are also signicant potential gains from the
reallocation of production factors in the Western Europe.
Recently, research on the relationship between productivity and competi-
tion is reduced to the analysis of the e¤ects of competition on the innovative
behavior of rms. One of the reasons behind the choice of the innovation as
the productivity performance measure of rms is the di¢ culty of measuring the
actual productivity. Traditional methods of productivity measurement rely on
somewhat strict assumptions on the competitive structure of the market that
is necessary when the output prices are unobservable at the rm level. Fur-
thermore, even if the rm level prices are observed by the researcher, it is still
di¢ cult to avoid the problem of comparing apples with peers, namely, achieve
the quality adjusted rm level output. Therefore, the productivity indices based
on the restrictive assumptions, such as perfect competition, are not expected
to provide valuable insights on the actual relationship between competition and
productivity.
However, considering the role of competition in the innovative behavior of
production units would also be insu¢ cient, if one aims to analyze the productiv-
ity enhancing e¤ects of the more intense interaction among rms. For instance,
rm level innovation measures cannot capture the static e¤ects of competition
on productivity. In addition to this, if the question is asked for a developing
country, it is hard to nd an indicator of innovation for which it is often used
the copyright and patent ownership based measures in the advanced country
studies.
Another di¢ culty in the analysis of the link between competition and pro-
ductivity, which is rather neglected in the related literature and constitutes the
main question of this paper, is the problem of measuring the intensity of compe-
tition. In the analysis of the economic e¤ects of competition, most widely used
indices can be listed as the price-cost margin, the concentration based measures
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such as Hirschman-Herndahl Index and the prot elasticity. Accordingly, the
rst part of this study develops a discussion over the performances of alterna-
tive measures of competition through a theoretical model where the rms di¤er
according to their productivity levels and there are frictions on the operational
activities of the production units. In the last part, we further compare the em-
pirical performances of the indices by using a panel of the rms operated in the
manufacturing sectors of Ukraine during 2004-2007. While doing so, we o¤er an
alternative measure of competition that is a modication of the prot elasticity
method, and relies on the rm level productivity retrieved from the estima-
tion of production functions at the industry level. The estimation methodology
takes into account the unobservable rm level prices up to a degree of constant
industry markup by introducing the demand side into the econometric model.
Therefore, the obtained rm level productivity index does not have the above
mentioned drawbacks such as the underlying assumption of perfect competi-
tion, so that we are able to derive insights on the actual relationship between
competition and productivity.
2 Indicative Quality of the Leading Measures of
Competition
Recently, it is almost a common sense that Hirschman-Herndahl index (HHI),
which measures the degree of concentration in an industry, is not a robust
indicator of the actual intensity of competition in the product market. HHI fails
to proxy the competition for many reasons, for instance, it does not account for
the competitive pressure due to the openness to international trade. Moreover,
HHI is strongly correlated with the number of rms in the industry, so that in
case the rm number falls because of a higher exit rate, which may be a sole
result of more intense competition, the index would still indicate a fall in the
intensity of competition.
On the other hand, the price-cost margin (PCM) that is often calculated by
the ratio of the total costs over revenues, does not seem to have such drawbacks.
For instance, in case the domestic rms partially lose their market share due to
an increase in the consumption of the imported goods, PCM would still indicate
a rise in the level of competition, even if the competitive pressure stemming from
the international trade is not observed by the researcher. Furthermore, PCM
can even be calculated for an industry that is consist of a single rm, and the
results would be still comparable with the other industries whatever the number
of rms operating in each segment. Thus, PCM is often preferred as a proxy
for the level of competition in the empirical research.1
However, PCM can also deviate from the actual intensity of competition
especially when there are frictions in the industry. For instance, in case of su¢ -
1 In particular, the seminal studies that analyze the relationship between competition and
productivity enhancing innovations such as the papers of Nickell, (1986); Geroski, (1995);
Blundell et al. (1995, 1999); Aghion et al. (2005, 2006) use the price-cost margin while
measuring the intensity of interaction among the rms in a market.
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ciently high barriers on rm entry, more intense competition would lead the exit
of the least e¢ cient rms, while the e¢ cient ones would have the opportunity
to capture the released market share due to insu¢ cient number of new entries.
This may lead an increase in the protability of the incumbent rms, although
the rm-to-rm interaction is more intensive within the industry. In that case,
PCM would still reect a fall in the intensity of competition.
The performance of di¤erent empirical measures of competition is extensively
analyzed in Boone (2008a, 2008b). Besides indicating the poorness of HHI as
a measure of competition, Boone further shows that PCM fails to proxy the
intensity of competition in a duopoly model with Cournot competition, and
o¤ers an alternative approach that relies on the elasticity of the relative prots
to the relative e¢ ciency. Boone (2001) points out the shortcomings of using
PCM while analyzing the relationship between competition and productivity,
since the rm level PCM is an endogenous variable that is mainly driven by
productivity. Therefore, using PCM as a proxy may lead to nd signicant
link between competition and productivity, but the ndings would be quite far
away from the true nature of the relationship.
In the next section, we evaluate the theoretical performances of the empiri-
cal price-cost margin and the prot elasticity in measuring the competition, and
provide insights on the drawbacks of the concentration based indices within a
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type monopolistic competition model. Our approach
is similar to Montagna (1995) in the sense that we introduce the rm level het-
erogeneity, and add a xed cost of operation that also serves as an entry barrier
in the model economy. The model di¤ers from Montagnas partial equilibrium
analysis, since rather than dening the e¢ ciency within the cost function, we
dene an explicit rm level production function with an idiosyncratic produc-
tivity variable and consider the labor market equilibrium in order to take into
account the wealth e¤ects on the pricing behavior of the heterogeneous rms.
2.1 The Model
The model industry consists ofN number of rms and a representative consumer
who supplies the labor inelastically and does not drive utility from leisure. There
are rm entry and exit in the model. Therefore, the potential entrant rm rstly
considers its expected prots, and then makes the decision to enter in or stay
out of the market. If the potential entrant makes the entry decision, the rm
realizes its productivity draw as soon as it starts to produce its variety, and
the xed cost of operation is paid simultaneously with the production process.
Once the productivity is drawn, the rm operates with it during all out of its
life time.
The incumbent rms also pay the xed operational cost in every period and
exit, if the expected future prots are negative. It is worth mentioning that
the rm level productivity is observable for only the manager of the rm, so
that neither the representative consumer nor the other rmsmanagers know
the rms productivity draw. However, the productivity distribution function
is known by all agents of the industry.
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2.1.1 Representative Consumers Problem
The representative consumers preferences are characterized by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) type utility function. There are N number of rms in the industry. Each
rm is assumed to produce a single variety of output that does not have any
perfect substitutes, so that N also represents the number of product varieties.
Throughout the formulization of the theoretical model, we drop the time indices
and the utility function is given by the below formula.
U =
"
NX
i=1
d
( 1)=
i
#=( 1)
(1)
In the utility function, di stands for the consumption of rm is product and
 > 1 is the elasticity that determines the degree of substitutability among the
product varieties. The utility function implies that the preferences are symmet-
ric and the consumer imperfectly substitutes among the product varieties.
The representative consumer does not benet from leisure, and the labor is
supplied inelastically
 
LS = 1

:Moreover, the rms are owned by the consumer,
so that the rmstotal prots constitute a source of income. Accordingly, the
consumer maximizes the utility function subject to the following budget con-
straint.
R =
NX
i=1
pidi (2)
In the above identity, R stands for the income level of the consumer that is
equal to the industry sum of the rm-revenues (ri = pidi), so that pi is the rm
level price or price of the variety i.
The utility maximization problem of the representative consumer provides
the following N   1 rst order conditions.
di
dj
=

pi
pj
 
(3)
Therefore, the relationship between the relative demand and price is inten-
sied by lower values of , so that the monopoly power is negatively correlated
with the substitution elasticity.
The industry level aggregate price index is the following function of the rm
level prices2 .
P =
 
N 1
NX
i=1
p1 i
!1=(1 )
(4)
2The price index given in equation (4) is a traditional way of representing the link between
aggregate and frim level prices (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Montagna, 1995; Levinson and
Melitz, 2004; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2007; Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008).
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Therefore, as the degree of substitutability falls ( ! 1) the index approaches
to the unweighted average of the rm level prices. Moreover, holding the variety-
prices constant, more intense competition driven by higher values of  decreases
the aggregate price index.
Thus, the consumers problem further provides the following demand func-
tion for rm is product.
di =
R
N
P  1p i (5)
According to equation (5), the variety specic demand is a function of the
number of varieties (N) that also stands for the number of imperfect substitutes,
the aggregate income level (R), the aggregate price index (P ) and the varietys
price (pi) with  (the elasticity of substitution) also representing the absolute
value of the price elasticity of demand.
2.1.2 Firms Problem
The industry is populated by N number of rms where each rm produces a
single variety of output that does not have any perfect substitutes. The rms
output is produced by the following type of production function.
qi = il

i i  N(; ) (6)
The rms di¤er according to their time-invariant productivity parameters
(i) and use one type of input (labor) in the production.  < 1 represents the
returns from labor input that is assumed to be constant over time and same
for all rms in the industry. The idiosyncratic productivity is randomly drawn
from a density function f() which is also constant and same for all rms. We
assume the rms draw their productivity from the normal distribution with a
positive mean () and standard deviation (). One can interpret the mean as
the industry-wide aggregate component of the productivity. However, since we
only consider the steady state dynamics of the model industry, the aggregate
component is assumed to be constant over time. Furthermore, jointly with the
constant mean, the variance determines the degree of rm level heterogeneity
or the level of productivity dispersion in the industry.
Dening pi (di) to be the rm level inverse demand function of rm is prod-
uct (eq.5), the rms per-period prot function i (:) can be given by the fol-
lowing formula.
i (i) = pi (il

i ) il

i  Wli    (7)
In the prot function, W is the wage level, and  represents the per-period
exogenous and xed operational cost that is same for all rms. Whatever it is
an entrant or incumbent, every rm has to pay the xed operational cost in the
beginning of every period. Thus,  also serves as a barrier on the entry that
decreases the potential entrantsexpected prots.
It is worth mentioning that by dening the industry sum of the rm-revenues
to be equal to the income of the consumer (eq.2), we do not allow the operational
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costs to disappear in the economy. This is because, in realistic scenario, xed
costs on the operational activities of rms often arise from di¤erent forms of
regulatory costs such as taxes, mandatory fees to obtain licences and permits,
or even the presence of corruption. However, from a macroeconomic perspective,
it is more plausible to think that the total xed costs paid by the rms should
increase either the government earnings or other income related variables such as
the wealth of the corrupt o¢ cers. Therefore, without introducing an economic
authority into the model, we dene the aggregate income to also involve the
total xed operational costs (N) paid by all the rms in the industry.
Assuming the aggregate and rm specic productivity components to be
time invariant, the rms decision process turns out to be a static optimization
problem where each rm maximizes the per-period prots. Therefore, the rst
order condition equates the marginal revenue of labor to the marginal cost up
to a degree of markup that provides with the following labor demand function
for rm i.
li (i) =

 (   1)


P  1 1i W
  R
N
 1
 ( 1)
(8)
Thus the rmslabor demand is a positive function of the productivity and
a negative function of the wage level as long as   (   1) is larger than zero.
This is also the main reason behind the assumption of decreasing returns from
labor ( < 1), so that the labor demand function is consistent with the predic-
tions of the standard theory. Furthermore, the condition of    (   1) > 0 is
satised for a particular region where the returns from the labor is increasing,
but the behavior of the model does not change signicantly, so that in the cali-
bration exercise, we restrict the parameter space with the inequality condition
of  < 1.
2.1.3 Steady State Equilibrium
In the equilibrium, the industry wide variables, R,W , P and N are constant. In
addition to this, one can dene a threshold level of productivity where an incum-
bent rm is indi¤erent between continuation and exit the market. Accordingly,
the prot of the threshold incumbent is zero in the steady state.
T

T ;W ; P ; N; R

= 0 (9)
T is the threshold productivity level to stay in the market, and the starred
variables represent the steady state equilibrium values. In case the rms pro-
ductivity is lower than this threshold level, its expected prots is negative, so
that exit is the optimal decision.
Since a rm cannot directly observe the othersproductivity draws, it devel-
ops its expectations over the known distribution function. Thus, the expected
total sales can be calculated by an integral over the revenues (ri) of the operating
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rms that could exceed the threshold productivity level (T ) of the industry.
E [R] = N
1Z
T
ri (i;W
; P ; N; R) f () d (10)
In equation (10), R appears on the both sides of the identity, where it stands
for the income level of the consumer on the right-hand side and the industry
sum of the revenues on the left-hand side, which are equal in the equilibrium.
The expected aggregate price index is given by the following formula.
E [P ] =
24 1Z
T
pi (i; P
; N; R)1  f () d
351=(1 ) (11)
Therefore, the expected industry-wide price index is calculated by the inte-
gral over the incumbentsprices.
The equilibrium entry condition requires the expected value of entry to be
driven to zero. Therefore, the free entry condition can be written as follows.
E

V E

=
1Z
 1
i (i;W
; P ; N; R) f () d = 0 (12)
According to equation (12) the potential entrant rm calculates the value of
entry by considering any possible productivity draw within the interval ( 1; 1).
Lastly, in the equilibrium, the labor supply
 
1 = LS

equates the labor de-
mand, so that the steady state labor market clearing condition can be repre-
sented by the below identity.
1 = N
1Z
T
li (i;W
; P ; N; R) f () d (13)
The right-hand side of equation (13) is the expected rm level labor demand
times the number of rms in the industry that gives the expected total labor
demand in the equilibrium.
As a result, the steady state is characterized by ve equilibrium conditions,
so that the ve endogenous variables, that are P , W , N, R and T , can be
fully identied in the steady state.
2.1.4 The Measures of Competition
We consider the substitution elasticity of demand ( > 1) as the main deter-
minant of the intensity of competition in the model industry. Accordingly, as
 rises, (   1) = approaches 1 indicating a perfect substitution among the
product varieties that constitutes highest level of interaction among the rms.
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Therefore, the indicative performance of the competition measures are com-
pared by observing their reaction to the changes in  for alternative parameter
settings. To simplify the interpretations, all the measures of competition indices
are formulated in a way that a higher value corresponds to a higher degree of
competition.
At the rm level, the price-cost margin (PCM) is given as the ratio of total
cost to revenues.
pcmi =
Wli + 
ri
(14)
Therefore, PCM consist of two ratios that we name the variable (Wli=ri)
and xed (=ri) components. The variable cost component can be expressed in
terms of price-cost mark-up, so that the total variable costs to revenues ratio is
equivalent to factor share to mark-up ratio in the steady state. More specically,
the following identity is valid for every rm in the model industry.
Wli
ri
=


(15)
Where  = = (   1) represents the mark-up and is a negative function of
the substitution elasticity. However, as we will see in the calibration analysis,
the xed component may not necessarily be an increasing function of . This is
because, the total size of the industry in terms of total revenues increases with
 due to the rise in the total number of rms and varieties. Therefore, when the
new entries are restricted by a xed cost, the incumbent rms may expand their
market share. Additionally, as a direct consequence of more intense interaction,
the less e¢ cient rms may exit the market that would further facilitate the
remaining rms to increase their sales in the equilibrium. Therefore, the reaction
of PCM to the changes in the substitution elasticity depends on the relative
importance of the variable and xed components that may move in the opposite
directions.
In the steady state, the industry level PCM can be calculated by an integral
over the distribution of the operating rms that are productive enough to stay
in the market. Thus, the industry-wide PCM can be given by the following
identity.
PCM =
1Z
T
pcmi (i) f () d (16)
Thereby, as PCM approaches to 1, the share of industry prots (costs) in
total sales are decreasing (increasing), which may or may not be interpreted as
a rise in the intensity of competition depending on the steady state dynamics
of the industry.
The Theoretical Prot Elasticity (TPE)
The prot elasticity method (Boone, 2008b) suggests that the ratio of the
prot of an e¢ cient rm to an ine¢ cient one is higher when competition is more
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intensive. Namely, high interaction leads the ine¢ cient rms to su¤er more or
benet less from competition than the e¢ cient one.
The prot elasticity method can be simply expressed by assuming an indus-
try with two rms where i represents the per-period prots of rm i. If rm 2
is more e¢ cient than rm 1, holding everything else same for these two rms,
one would expect the prot of the more e¢ cient rm to be higher (2 > 1).
Therefore, if the competition is more intensive at time t+1 than it is at time t,
the inequality (2=1)t+1 > (2=1)t holds. In other words, more intense com-
petition widens the gap between the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient units, while some
of the ine¢ cient ones may be driven out of the market as a direct consequence
of intensive interaction.
In case there are N number of rms in the industry, by assuming that rm
j is the benchmark rm that is the least e¢ cient production unit, one would
expect the inequality to hold for every rm i 6= j. Therefore, if we dene the
relative prots as a sole function of the relative e¢ ciency, the absolute value
of the slope of the relative prots curve would be higher when competition is
intensied.
While in the theoretical model (Boone, 2008a; 2008b), Boone denes the rm
level marginal cost as the source of rm level heterogeneity and the measure of
e¢ ciency, in our model, the rm level e¢ ciency is captured in the productivity
parameter i. Since our focus is on the relative e¢ ciency measure to be used in
the measurement of the prot elasticity, one rst needs to check the dependent
variable side of the equation is a robust measure of the rm performance as a
function of productivity.
Proposition 1 Firm prots are monotonically increasing in .
Therefore, in the model, the theoretical measure of the prot elasticity is
the slope of the relative prots (i=j) as a function of relative productivity
(i=j).
Proposition 2 When  = 0, the elasticity of relative prots to relative produc-
tivity is increasing as the substitution elasticity rises.
Thus, in a frictionless economy, in case the intensity of interaction among
the rms rises through an increase in , the elasticity of prots to productivity
indicates a higher level of competition in the steady state. However, when
 6= 0, the prot function is not homogeneous, and a numerical derivation of the
elasticity is inapplicable. Therefore, we investigate the behavior of the elasticity
of the prots to the productivity in the presence of positive operational costs by
calibrating the steady state equilibrium in the model industry for a wide range
of alternative parameter values. Throughout the rest of this paper, we refer the
productivity elasticity of prots as the "theoretical" prot elasticity (TPE).
The Empirical Prot Elasticity (EPE)
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In the estimation of the prot elasticity3 , Boone et al. (2007) use the ratio
of the variable costs to sales as a proxy for the measure of rm level e¢ ciency
and regress the prots on this e¢ ciency measure. However, as it is shown in
equation (15), the variable cost to revenue ratio is identical to the factor share
to mark-up ratio in the model industry. Therefore, the rm level e¢ ciency
measure of Boone et al. (2007) is same for all rms, so that the empirical
technique is inapplicable in our theoretical setting. One can introduce rm level
variation in the mark-up () or the returns to scale parameter (), but non of the
parameters can be expected to be correlated with the true rm level e¢ ciency
unless they are assumed to be a function of the productivity. However, there
is a strong correlation between  or  and the rm level prots. Thus, if  or
 are modied to be variable across the rms and over time, the methodology
would still indicate a signicant relationship between the prots and the cost to
revenue ratio without measuring the elasticity of prots to the real e¢ ciency.
Secondly, it is very hard to distinguish between perfectly variable and xed
factors of production in the empirical analysis. Various studies ignore any kind
of hiring or ring costs, or frictions in the labor market, and consider the labor
input to be a perfectly variable factor of production. However, introducing any
type of xed costs into the input expenditures to revenue ratio would signif-
icantly distort the theoretical predictions. In order to capture the distorting
e¤ects of imperfectly variable costs on the index of prot elasticity, we further
modied the e¢ ciency measure to involve the xed operational cost (), so that
we retrieve rm level variation in the cost e¢ ciency variable.
It is also worth mentioning that when one uses a cost e¢ ciency measure,
say ci, where lower values of ci indicates higher e¢ ciency, the plot of the func-
tion that represents the relationship between the relative prots and relative
e¢ ciency has a negative slope. Conversely, if one uses productivity as the e¢ -
ciency measure, the relative prots line would have a positive slope coe¢ cient.
Nevertheless, such a distinction does not alter the theoretical predictions of the
prot elasticity method, so that, whatever the e¢ ciency measure is used, the
prot elasticity would indicate higher level of competition as the relative prots
line becomes steeper. Namely, the more e¢ cient rms, that have lower ci or
higher productivity, would experience higher prot gains (or lower reduction in
prots ) relative to the less e¢ cient rms when the competition is intensied.
Therefore, in case ci is the e¢ ciency measure, multiplying the prot elasticity
with  1 would be su¢ cient to compare the results with the prot elasticity
based on productivity, so that both competition indices would be expected to
be positively correlated with the actual intensity of competition. However, the
3Boone et al. (2007) measure the slope of the relative prots curve through the estimation
of the following equation by OLS.
ln (i;t) = t + 0;i + 1;t ln (ci;t) + "i;t
Assuming index j represents the benchmark rm, the time variant intercept satises
t = ln (j;t)  1;t ln (cj;t), so that the selection of the benchmark does not a¤ect the slope
coe¢ cient. The prot elasticity as a measure of competition is simply the slope coe¢ cient
1;t. So, if the linear regression line becomes steeper, in other words, 1;t is larger, the relative
prots method concludes that the competition is intensied.
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main di¤erence arises in the search of the empirically robust measure of the rm
level e¢ ciency as we will see below.
We dene the total cost share in revenue, hereafter the unit cost (ci = 1  
i=ri), as the alternative e¢ ciency measure and refer the elasticity of the prots
to ci as the "empirical" measure of the prot elasticity (EPE). Therefore, the
e¢ ciency measure of EPE is identical to the rm level PCM and consists
of the variable (Wli=ri = =) and xed (=ri) costs to revenue ratios where
the variable cost component is same for all rms, so that only the xed cost
component is rm specic. Moreover, since the rms revenue is a positive
function of productivity (a proof is given in the appendix part jointly with the
proof of Proposition 1), the e¢ ciency measure of EPE gives the same e¢ ciency
ordering of rms with the productivity index. However, as it is mentioned
before, a rise in  directly e¤ects the e¢ ciency measure of EPE in the steady
state equilibrium.
Accordingly, if the rms revenue is a positive function of , the rise in  leads
the e¢ ciency measures of any two rms to converge due to the decrease in the
rm-specic, xed component, and the increase in the rm-invariant, variable
component. This would further lead the cost e¢ ciency ratio of the more to less
e¢ cient rm (ci=cj where cj > ci) to rise with  in the steady state. Moreover,
if the rate of the increase in ci=cj is higher than the increase in i=j , EPE
would indicate a fall in the competition as the elasticity of substitution rises.
In the calibration of the theoretical model, we need two points on the relative
prots curve to retrieve the slope of the linear approximation. This means
evaluating three rms with three di¤erent e¢ ciency measures where the least
e¢ cient rm is taken to be the benchmark rm. It is important to keep these
rms, so their productivity parameters, xed throughout di¤erent parameter
settings, otherwise it is impossible to compare the slope of the relative prots
curve between any two experiments. Moreover, its also crucial that these three
rms should stay in the market during di¤erent experiments, so that we require
the rm level productivity values to be higher than the threshold productivity
in alternative cases. Assuming the e¢ ciency ordering of the three rms is 3 >
2 > 1, so that c3 < c2 < c1, the true prot elasticity is calculated as follows.
TPE =
3 (3)
1 (1)
  2 (2)
1 (1)
3
1
  2
1
(17)
Similarly, in order to retrieve the identity for EPE, one should substitute
is with cis in the above formula and multiply the right hand side with  1.
2.2 Calibration Exercise
For the calibration analysis, we need to calculate the steady state values of the
industry-wide endogenous variables that are R;W;P;N and T . Therefore, we
apply an iterative method over the equilibrium identities listed in the previous
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parts under the title of "steady state equilibrium". Given the exogenous para-
meter values for ; ; ;  and , the procedure starts by assuming initial values
for wage W (0), P (0) and T (0).
In the benchmark equations of the model, the income level shows up in the
form of the average rm sales (~r = R=N), so that we use ~r in the formulation of
the calibration algorithm. Given the initial values of the wage, aggregate price
level and threshold productivity, one can calculate the steady state ~r through
equation (10). It is worth noting that although the right-hand side of the equa-
tion is also a function of ~r, the average income level is independent of the
idiosyncratic productivity () at the steady state. Thus, one can take ~r out of
the integral. Therefore, given W (0), P (0) and T (0), equation (10) provides an
explicit identity for the average income level
 
~r(1)

.  representing the mark-up,
the identity can be written as follows.
E [~r] =
0@ 1Z
T


W

Pi
 1
 
f () d
1A
 
1 
(18)
In the next step, for given ~r(1), W (0) and P (0), one can update the initial
guess of the threshold productivity through the threshold incumbents equilib-
rium condition given in equation (9). By using the new value for the threshold
productivity (T (1)) and for given ~r(1), T (1) and P (1), the initial guess of the
aggregate price index is updated through the steady state aggregate price iden-
tity (eq. 11) for given ~r(1) and W (0). In the next step, the initial guess of the
aggregate wage level is updated by the free entry condition (eq. 12). Lastly, the
number of rms or varieties are calculated through equation (13) by using the
updated values of the endogenous variables (~r(1), W (1), P (1) and T (1)) .
After updating the initial guesses for the ve endogenous variables, we repeat
the procedure with the new values, and the iterative algorithm is continued until
the convergence is achieved in the ve equilibrium conditions simultaneously.
2.2.1 Parameter Values
We have a set of 6 exogenous parameters, ; ; ;  and , for which we need to
assume numeric values for the calibration analysis. Rather than assigning a sin-
gle value, we consider an interval for each parameter and conduct the robustness
checks simultaneously with the interpretations of the results. Accordingly, we
consider the e¤ects of alternative degrees of decreasing returns from labor input
by allowing  to lie between 0:7 and 0:9. In the econometric part, the calcu-
lated coe¢ cient of variations for the productivity distributions in the Ukrainian
manufacturing industries range between 1 and 50. The coe¢ cient of variation
corresponds to the ratio of the standard deviation to mean that is = in the
theoretical model, so that  2 [5; 15] and  2 [0:5; 1:5] are set to approximately
match with the observed productivity dispersion in the data. The elasticity of
substitution  is considered to lie between 1:3 and 2:8, so that we ignore very
high degrees of substitutability where the mark-up is close to 1 and the model
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dynamics tend to replicate the predictions of the standard perfect competition
model. Lastly, the value of the operational cost () is allowed to range between
4 and 6, so that  is approximately equal to 10% of the revenue of the average
rm in the industry.
2.2.2 Results of the Calibration Exercise
Throughout the interpretation of the theoretical results, we consider the sub-
stitution elasticity to be the main determinant of the intensity of interaction
among rms, so that the performances of the competition indices are evaluated
according to their responses to the changes in . Therefore, in the rst scenario,
the steady state equilibrium values of the respective endogenous variables are
plotted against the elasticity of substitution ( 2 [1:3; 2:8]) for alternative re-
turns to scale parameters ( 2 f0:7; 0:9g). While doing so, two variables that
determine the degree of the productivity dispersion are assumed to be  = 10
and  = 1, and the value of the operational cost is  = 5.
Figure I: Calibration Results
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The top panel of Figure I displays the reaction of the expected rm-level
revenue and prots to the changes in the elasticity of substitution for alternative
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degrees of returns from the labor input. As the intensity of interaction increases,
both the expected prots and revenues rise in the steady state. Moreover, the
number of rms goes up with , which implies the aggregate income level to
expand with higher competition. Therefore, the industry-wide PCM falls, if
the rise in the revenues outpace the prots, while the reaction of EPE depends
on the relative importance of the increase in the e¢ ciency measure (ci=cj) due
to the shrinking xed-cost component (=r).
The down-left panel of Figure I shows that the rm size measured by the
amount of labor used in the production is a decreasing function of the elasticity
of substitution. Since,  enters into the production function through the labor
input, the expected quantity of rms output falls with  for given . Therefore,
we can conclude that the increasing e¤ect of  on the expected rm revenues
is mainly driven by the rm level prices, which will be further displayed in the
following scenarios.
The degree of the returns from labor input () also a¤ects the steady state
values, so that the expected rm size is larger for higher , while the revenues
and prots are lower in the equilibrium. However, the main picture of the
industry does not really sensitive to the changes in  as we will further see
below.
Figure II: Calibration Results
 = 10;  = 1;  = 5
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The up-left panel of Figure II displays that EPE is negatively correlated
with the substitution elasticity for lower values of , while the relationship
turns out to be positive as the intensity of interaction rises. Therefore, the in-
crease in the relative e¢ ciency measure of EPE outpaces the rise in the relative
prots when  is relatively low. However, since the rm invariant variable-cost
component (=) is increasing with  due to the lower mark-ups (), and the
xed-cost component falls (=r), the rate of the rise in the the relative e¢ ciency
measure (ci=cj where ci = = + =ri) slows down as the competition intensi-
es. Therefore, for su¢ ciently high values of , EPE is positively correlated
with the true intensity of interaction among the rms. It is worth mentioning
that higher values of  lead the benchmark value of , which corresponds to
the point where EPE reaches the minimum, to be lower. This is because the
relative importance of the variable-cost component in the rm level e¢ ciency
index rises, while the xed-cost component shrinks with the higher returns from
labor. As a result, the relative e¢ ciency measure of EPE does not reect the
true e¢ ciency ratios of the rms when  is relatively low.
In the up-right panel, PCM exhibits negative correlation with the level of
competition where the negative relationship weakens as  rises4 . The downward
sloping PCM curve is mainly driven by the dominance of the decreasing e¤ect
of the xed-cost component over the rising variable-cost component.
Intuitively, the negative relationship between PCM and  heavily relies on
the presence of the operational costs. As it is shown in Figure I, the overall
income level increases with higher degrees of competition, but whether the in-
cumbents would increase their prot to sale ratios as a response to  depends
on the entry and exit dynamics. Therefore, if we diminish the expected value
of entry and facilitate the exit of less e¢ cient incumbents by introducing su¢ -
ciently high operational cost, the incumbent rms that are productive enough
to stay in the market would increase their share of the prots in revenues as
the competition rises. In other words, more intense interaction provides the
high productivity incumbents with the opportunity to push the low productiv-
ity rms out of the market, while the potential competitive pressure coming
from the new entries is restricted by the cost parameter. This can be also seen
at the down-right panel of Figure II, where the threshold productivity to stay
in the market goes up by higher values of .
Conversely, one can think of the income expanding role of the high level
of competition having an opposite e¤ect that encourage the potential rms
to enter into the market, so that for su¢ ciently high values of , the negative
correlation between PCM and the substitution elasticity disappears. Moreover,
as the returns from the labor input increases, the negative correlation between
PCM and  further weakens, while PCM rises with  for given . This is
mainly due to the increasing importance of the labor input in comparison to
the idiosyncratic productivity parameter in the production function, so that
4The results for values of  higher than 2:8 are not reported basically because the model
industry tends to replicate the dynamics of the perfectly competitive market. However, all
the measures of competition listed in this paper are theoretically positively correlated with
the real intensity of interaction as the model approaches to perfect competition.
16
the productivity advantage of the more e¢ cient units disappears as the labor
becomes the dominant component of the production function.
The down-left panel of Figure II also shows that TPE is monotonically
increasing in , and the relationship is almost linear for alternative values of .
Figure III: Calibration Results
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According to Figure III, the industry-wide price index and the wage level
boost by more intense competition. This is a direct consequence of the income
expanding e¤ect of the elasticity of substitution that rises the aggregate nominal
variables in the steady state. Moreover, while higher  leads the total labor
demand and the wage level to increase, it also shifts the expected output curve
up for given amount of labor, which in turn diminishes the aggregate price index
in the equilibrium.
Besides, the rm level price function derived from the rmsdemand identity
(eq. 5) is a negative function of the productivity, the bottom panel of Figure III
further shows that the expected rm level price and the quantity of the output
move in the opposite directions as the competition intensies. This is an impor-
tant feature of the model for the empirical analysis, so that if one uses revenues
as a proxy for the quantity of output with the aim of, for instance, to calculate
the labor productivity, the empirical productivity index would involve the price
17
e¤ects and be a highly distorted measure of the actual productivity. Deating
the rm revenues with an aggregate price index would be also problematic due
to the negative correlation between the rm level prices and the productivity,
so that the empirical productivity index based on the price adjusted revenues
would underestimate (overestimate) the actual productivity level of the more
(less) e¢ cient production units5 .
The asymmetric e¤ect of competition on the price and the output levels
of the rms play a key role in the mechanism that cause PCM and EPE to
deviate from the direction of the true intensity of interaction. Since the quantity
of output is a decreasing function of , the rise in the rm revenues with higher
level of competition is mainly driven by the upward shift in the rm level prices,
so that the xed and variable components involved in the rm level PCM and
the e¢ ciency measure of EPE move in the opposite directions. Therefore, if
the empirical researcher would observe the prices at the rm level, it would be
possible to extract the distorting part of EPE; for instance, a quantity based
input to output ratio would be a suitable e¢ ciency measure that would lead
EPE to be monotonically increasing in .
In the second scenario, we investigate the e¤ects of the substitution elasticity
( 2 [1:3; 2:8]) on the industry dynamics for alternative degrees of productivity
dispersion. While doing so, the industry-wide component of the idiosyncratic
productivity held constant ( = 1), and the standard deviation of the produc-
tivity distribution () takes two alternative values. As in the rst experiment,
the operational cost is set to  = 5; and the returns from labor is  = 0:9.
It is important to notice that as the degree of the rm level heterogeneity
diminishes, the industry collapses into a model of a single representative rm
and variety of output, where the e¤ects of the substitution elasticity vanishes.
Conversely, as the standard deviation of the productivity distribution increases,
the e¤ects of competition on the model industry dynamics are amplied. We do
not report the behavior of the expected rm size, revenues, prots and output,
but all of them except the expected rm size further rises with  for given degree
of substitutability among the product varieties. Since the rm size is a negative
function of , it further shrinks with the higher levels of productivity dispersion.
5For further discussion and empirical support on the negative relationship between rm
level prices and the quantity based productivity see Foster et al. (2008).
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Figure IV: Calibration Results
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The down-right panel of Figure IV shows that the threshold productivity
level to stay in the market goes up by , and the rising e¤ect of the substi-
tution elasticity on T is amplied when the productivity is more dispersed.
Therefore, for higher , the market conditions are stricter for the low produc-
tivity incumbents, which facilitates the productive ones to further enhance their
protability. As a result, for given , PCM falls with  in the steady state.
The U-shaped relationship between EPE and the elasticity of substitution
becomes more apparent as the productivity is more dispersed. Moreover, the
benchmark level of , where EPE curve has a zero slope, shifts to the right,
indicating the relative e¢ ciency measure of EPE requires higher levels of rm
interaction to reect the true relationship. On the other hand, TPE is monoton-
ically increasing in  for alternative degrees of rm heterogeneity, and sensitivity
of TPE to  rises with .
As we use the coe¢ cient of variation (=) to measure the productivity
dispersion in the empirical part, one can think of a fall in  to create the same
impact with the higher degree of rm heterogeneity driven by an increase in
. Therefore, we do not display the e¤ects of  on the industry dynamics
separately, since the mechanism described in Figure IV is same when we change
the productivity dispersion by the industry mean of the productivity distribution
where a lower  corresponds to a higher value of .
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In the next set of graphs, the relationship between the level of competition
and the response of the endogenous indicators are investigated for alternative
values of the operational cost parameter. Therefore,  2 f4; 6g,  = 0:9,  = 10
and  = 1.
It is also worth mentioning that when the xed cost is zero ( = 0), PCM
is identical to the factor elasticity to mark-up ratio (=) that is monotonically
increasing in the elasticity of substitution. Namely, the violation of the positive
correlation between PCM and  mainly depends on the introduction of the
xed costs into the model industry. On the other hand, in the absence of , the
e¢ ciency measure of EPE is also identical to = that is same for all rms,
so that EPE is not measurable in the case of  = 0. In addition to this, as it
is stated in Proposition 2 and analytically proved in the appendix part, TPE
is monotonically increasing in  when the operational cost is zero. However,
as long as the operational cost is strictly positive and su¢ ciently high, the
responses of the regarding competition indices to the changes in the elasticity
of substitution are irrespective of the alternative values of .
Figure V: Calibration Results
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When the operational cost is higher, the total size of the industry (R) shrinks
and the concentration rises in the steady state. Figure V shows that total
number rms falls and the expected rm size in terms of the amount of labor
employed in the production expands with . In that case, both the negative
relationship between rm size and , and the positive correlation of the number
of rms with the elasticity of substitution are still valid for alternative values
of the cost parameter. However, higher  facilitates the less e¢ cient rms to
exit the market and lowers the expected value of entry that leads the remaining
rms to increase their market share, so that market concentration rise without
any change in the degree of the substitutability among the product varieties.
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Figure VI: Calibration Results
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As it is shown in the bottom panel of Figure VI, the expected wage level and
the industry-wide price index are lower in the equilibrium with higher values of
. This is mainly due to the fall in the total income created in the industry,
because the resources are further transferred from the productive production
process to the representative consumer as a component of income.
Top panel of Figure VI further shows that the expected revenues and prots
increase with . In addition to this, the upward shift in the rm revenues is
proportional to the rise in , so that the share of the xed operational cost in the
rms revenue stays same for alternative values of the operational cost parame-
ter. The variable cost to revenue ratio is also independent of , so that PCM
does not change with the magnitude of the frictions in the industry. More-
over, since the operational costs are symmetric for all rms, every incumbent
rm experiences a proportional increase in the prots that further leads EPE
and TPE to be independent of  in the steady state. However, for given ,
concentration based measures of competition would indicate lower intensity of
interaction with higher values of .
21
3 Emprical Analysis of the Competition Indices
Throughout the theoretical discussions in the previous part, we point out the
possible factors that distort the measurement of the product market competi-
tion through the price-cost margin (PCM) and the empirical prot elasticity
(EPE). Accordingly, PCM deviates from the true direction of competition
when we introduce the operational costs at the rm level. In that case, the xed
cost to revenue ratio falls with more intense competition, which leads PCM to
be negatively correlated with the elasticity of substitution for relatively lower
degrees of substitutability among the product varieties. Intuitively, the pres-
ence of the operational costs lowers the expected value of entry and makes the
survival more di¢ cult for the less e¢ cient production units, so that the more
e¢ cient incumbents expand their market share and enhance their protability
with more intense competition.
Moreover, the rm level PCM is also used as the cost e¢ ciency measure of
EPE, and does not reect the true relative e¢ ciency between any two rms,
when the elasticity of substitution is relatively low. While the competition leads
the prot of the more e¢ cient rm to increase at a higher rate than that of the
less e¢ cient one, the cost e¢ ciency levels (measured by total input expenditures
to revenue ratio) of the two rms converge, so that the relative e¢ ciency also
rises with the elasticity of substitution in the equilibrium. The convergence of
the cost e¢ ciency measures is driven by the shrinking xed-cost component due
to the rise in the rm revenues, while the variable costs to revenue ratio is equal
to = and same for all rms. Therefore, the rate of increase in the relative cost
e¢ ciency outpaces the rise in the relative prots, so that EPE exhibits negative
correlation with the substitution elasticity for the region where the degree of
substitutability is relatively low.
Additionally, the rise in the rm revenue, so the fall in the xed cost compo-
nent of the rm level PCM is mainly due to the opposite movements in the rm
level prices and the quantity of output with more intensive competition driven
by higher degrees of substitutability. Therefore, the deviation of EPE from the
true direction of the intensity of interaction relies on the implicit assumption
that the rm level prices are unobservable for the empirical researcher. Other-
wise, it would be possible to calculate a quantity based input to output ratio
that would reect the real level of productivity, and EPE would give similar
results with TPE for the model industry.
3.1 Econometric Model
This part of the analysis aims to nd a robust productivity measure that does
not include the output price e¤ects, so that we can robustly measure the in-
tensity of competition in Ukraines manufacturing industries. While doing so,
we introduce the capital stock and the materials to be the other two factors of
production. We further assume a Cobb-Douglas type production function in the
following form, where Qit, it, Kit, Lit and Mit are the rm level output, total
factor productivity, capital, labor and material inputs respectively, and is are
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the respective factor elasticity parameters.
Qit = itK
K
it L
L
it M
M
it (19)
As it is often the case in the empirical analysis with rm-level datasets, we do
not observe the actual quantity of output but the revenues. In order to express
the production function in terms of revenues, we utilize the demand side of the
theoretical model depicted in the previous part. The rm level demand function
(eq. 5) provides the following identity that links the quantity of the output to
the revenue of a rm in the equilibrium and eliminates the rm-level prices in
the formulation.
Rit
Pt
=
 Rt
Pt
 1

Q
1

it (20)
As in the previous part,  = = (   1) represents the mark-up variable and
Rt = N
 1
t
PN
i Rit is the mean of the revenue in the industry. Therefore, the
aggregate term Rt=Pt stands for the industry level demand shifter that provides
a direct estimate of the industry specic substitution elasticity (for discussions
and examples of alternative demand specications see Melitz and Levinsohn,
2004; Martin, 2005; De Loecker, 2007). By introducing the production function
in the place of Qit in equation (20), we retrieve the following estimation equa-
tion at the industry level where the lower case letters represents the respective
variables in logarithms. We further remove the aggregate price index from the
formulation so that rit and rt are the logs of the deated revenues at the rm
and industry level respectively.
rit = 0 + Ert + Mmit + Llit + Kkit + it= + it (21)
Therefore, the coe¢ cient of the demand shifter is equal to E = 1=, and
the production factorscoe¢ cients satisfy the identity that j = 
j= where j 2
fM; L; Kg. The markup parameter that appears jointly with the idiosyncratic
productivity variable () is fully identied through the estimated coe¢ cient of
E , so  that lies below the unobserved productivity term (it) is substracted
from the rest of the formulation of the econometric model.
3.2 Estimation Methodology
The main di¢ culty in the estimation of the production functions is the corre-
lation between the unobserved productivity shocks and the amount of inputs
used in the production. In other words, the manager can observe the rms pro-
ductivity and use this knowledge in the decision phase of the optimal amount
of input to be used in the production, so that one would expect endogeneity in
the rmsinput usage.
As dealing with the endogeneity problem, our method does not di¤er from
the two step estimation procedure with a proxy variable inspired by Olley and
Pakes (1996) (OP). OP deal with the endogeneity of inputs by assuming the
rms to immediately alter their investments in response to the productivity
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shocks. However, while the investments as a proxy for productivity can theoret-
ically answer the endogeneity problem, in practice, it creates its own shortcom-
ings such as the presence of zero investments in the estimation sample. So far
the most common ways of dealing with the zero investment problem is replacing
them with a small positive number or deleting the regarding observation that
may introduce additional error or cause severe selection bias in the estimation
procedure. Especially in the developing countries, the rms often decide not
to invest for reasons such as the high levels of uncertainty, the frictions in the
nancial markets and high regulatory burden of investing. In addition to this,
approximately one third of the total number of the rms report zero investment
in our sample which makes the OP method rather infeasible to apply in our
case.
In the estimation of the modied production function, we utilize Levinsohn
and Petrins (2003) approach (LP) that suggests the materials to be used as the
proxy for the unobserved productivity. LP further argue that, besides solving
the zero investment problem, the modied method o¤ers a better proxy for
unobserved component since the investments are rather lumpy in responding
the productivity shocks.
Accordingly, we dene the rms material usage as a function of produc-
tivity and the capital stock as the state variable (mit (it; kit)). Assuming mit
is monotone in it, we can invert the materials equation to obtain the proxy
function that is it = it (mit; kit), where  (:) = m
 1 (:). However, introducing
the proxy identity into the production function makes it impossible to identify
the coe¢ cients of the capital and materials in a single step, so that we require
a second stage to recover all factor elasticity parameters. LP routine combines
all the terms of the production function that includes materials and capital in
a control function git(mit; kit) which is dened as a third order polynomial in
its arguments. Therefore, by introducing the demand shifter (rt) as a variable
that is independent of the idiosyncratic and i.i.d. shock component (it), the
rst stage regression equation takes the following form.
rit = Ert + Llit + git(mit; kit) + it (22)
In the above regression equation, git(mit; kit) = 0 + Mmit + Kkit +
it (mit; kit) constitutes the non-parametric part of the estimation equation that
takes into account the endogeneity between the productivity and the amount of
capital and materials used in the production.6
The second stage, relies on the assumption that it evolves as a rst-order
Markov process. Namely, it = E fit j it 1g + it where it is i.i.d. Thus,
for any candidate values of K and 

M ; the method retrieves the estimates of
^it = g^it   Mmit   Kkit, and a consistent nonparametric approximation of
6As Ackerberg (2006) argues, there is a possible correlation between the labor input and the
shock term (it) which may result in biased estimates of L in the rst stage regression of LP
algorithm. As in the original structural model, we rule out the endogeneity of the labor input
by assuming that the manager does not have perfect knowledge on the productivity shocks
rm face as long as the labor is hired. This assumption further allows us to consistently
estimate E and L by using OLS.
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E fit j it 1g for given K and M can be obtained by the following regression.
E dfit j it 1g = 0 + 1^it 1 + 2^2it 1 + 3^3it 1 + it (23)
We obtain the estimates of K and M by implementing GMMminimization
method as in the Levinsohn et al. (2004) on the joint error term given by the
following equation7 .
it + it = rit   ^Ert   Mmit   ^Llit   Kkit   E dfit j it 1g (24)
In order to identify K and M , we assume that the previous periodslevels
of the materials, labor and the aggregate demand shifter are uncorrelated with
this periods productivity shock, so that mt 1, kt 1, lt 1 and rt 1 provides the
necessary moment conditions. Moreover, assuming the todays capital stock to
be determined by the previous periodsinvestments that are uncorrelated with
the period ts error, kt is further used as the instrument for the GMM algorithm.
3.3 The Dataset
Our dataset consists of an annual sample of the manufacturing rms operating
in Ukraine during 2004-2007. The revenue variable is represented as the nominal
sales after tax and the labor input is the total hours worked by the full and part
time employees of a rm in a given year. The materials input is proxied by the
total nominal costs of goods and services, acquired for the re-sale and realized
without an additional processing plus expenses for power, and for the capital
input, we use the reported depreciation of the capital stock at a given enterprise.
The State Statistical Committee of Ukraine reports the producer price in-
dices (PPI) for the manufacturing sector at the 2-digit industry level. While
constructing the deated revenues, we take account of the multi-product rms
that simultaneously operate in more than one industry. Therefore, each product
category is deated by its own industry level PPI, and the rms main industry
is classied according to the industry code of its largest product category.
However, we do not have any industry specic deators for the capital and
material inputs for which we dene economy-wide price indices. The material
expenses are price-adjusted by the consumer price index, and for the capital
stock we construct a price index that is a weighted average of the PPIs of
the 2-digit manufacturing industries that are classied as the capital goods
and services producing sectors. Although, we neglect the possible bias due to
ignoring the variation in input prices, we can still refer Eslava et al. (2005) that
analyzes Colombian data with detailed input and output prices. Therefore,
they conclude that while ignoring the rm-variation in the output prices can
dramatically a¤ect the TFP measure, ignoring the variation in the input prices
has only minor e¤ects on the estimated productivity indices.
7The LP (levpet) routine written for Stata uses Newtons method for the minimization
problem, and employs the bootstrap to estimate the standard errors. For details, see Levinsohn
et al., (2004).
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It is worth mentioning that our methodology necessitates an industry specic
price index which prevents us from estimating the production functions at the
more disaggregated industry level. Thus, the production functions are estimated
separately for Ukrainian manufacturing industries where the grouping of each
segment is identical to the 2-digit NACE industry classication. The basic
statistics on the dataset and the denition of the industry codes used in the
following charts and tables can be found in the appendix part.
3.4 Productivity estimates
We estimate the production functions for 14 Ukrainian manufacturing industries
seperately where the estimation results and the standard errors can be found
in the appendix part. Accordingly, for the two industries, the estimated coe¢ -
cients of E = 1= are signicant at 5% level while for all the other industries
the regarding estimates are signicant at 1% level. However, in one industry,
that is the manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products, the es-
timated coe¢ cient is signicantly negative with a value of 1= =  0:12. While
our structural model rules out the negative values of the elasticity, the regarding
competition measures indicate a high intensity of competition for this industry
which is consistent with a low value of 1=. Nevertheless, we extract the con-
siderations for this sector (with the industry code of DJ) from the analysis, and
report the results of the remaining 13 manufacturing industries for which the
estimations of 1= lie between 0 and 1:
Table I displays the estimated substitution elasticity coe¢ cients, the two
dispersion measures that are the coe¢ cient of variation and the inter-quartile
range, and a sensitivity measure for the impact of  on TFP. We also report the
dispersion measures for the labor productivity (the ratio of deated revenues
to total work hours), so that we can compare our TFP estimations with an
alternative measure of productivity that theoretically involves the variation in
the output prices.
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Table I. Statistics on Production Function Estimates
Industry Elasticity () C. of Variation Inter-Q. Range 50% increase in 
TFP LP TFP LP
DA 9.4 2.2 17.7 0.5 1.8 1.7
DB 1.3 48.2 16.9 12.0 1.6 1.1
DC 1.7 11.8 6.5 2.2 2.2 2.0
DD 2.5 15.3 18.4 1.1 1.7 1.2
DE 2.2 5.5 27.4 1.4 1.7 3.4
DF 1.5* 16.7 1.9 2.3 2.1 29.2
DG 9.9* 1.7 3.0 0.5 1.6 1.6
DH 2.7 13.7 19.8 1.1 1.6 4.0
DI 9.2 0.9 7.4 0.5 1.8 0.6
DK 2.3 12.6 8.5 1.1 1.5 1.7
DL 3.8 6.3 5.3 0.7 1.8 1.8
DM 2.6 11.2 6.8 1.0 1.6 2.4
DN 1.5 55.4 6.9 4.1 1.9 4.3
* Signicant at 5% level. The rest of s are signicant at %1.
Accordingly, TFP is more dispersed in the manufacturing sectors that ex-
hibit relatively low substitution elasticity. While analyzing the determinants of
the productivity dispersion is beyond the scope of this paper, our ndings sup-
port the argument that in the highly competitive industries the rms are less
heterogenous in terms of their productivity draws which may be due to the well
functioning of the creative destruction process and the e¢ ciency of the alloca-
tion of the resources in more competitive sectors. Namely, when the interaction
among the rms is intensive, the industry dynamics only allow for the highly
productive units to stay in the market that leads a convergence in terms of the
idiosyncratic productivity levels.
Moreover, the dispersion in the estimated TFP is greater than that of the la-
bor productivity in the sectors where  is estimated to be relatively low, such as
the sectors DB, DC, DF , DK, DM and DN . Therefore, when the variation in
the output prices is controlled for up to the degree of constant industry markup,
the dispersion of the productivity widens especially in the industries that exhibit
higher mark-ups. This is in line with our theoretical discussion where we point
out the fact that the output prices are negatively correlated with the produc-
tivity, so that one would expect the more (less) productive rms measured to
be less (more) productive, unless the productivity index is adjusted for the rm
level price e¤ects as in the standard measure of the labor productivity. Foster
et al. (2008) further provide empirical support for the validity of the negative
correlation between the rm level prices and the productivity draws.
The last column of Table I displays the impact of a 50% increase in  on TFP,
which is calculated by evaluating the industry specic production functions at
the industry mean of the observables. Accordingly, in all listed industries, the
substitution elasticity has a positive impact on the total factor productivity.
Moreover, for the industries with relatively low values of , the productivity
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gains from a higher level of interaction are larger.
3.5 Comparative Analysis of the Competition Indices
The comparative analysis of the performances of the competition indices is sep-
arated into two parts where in the rst part we only consider the time-invariant
and industry specic results and in the second part the time dimension is added
to the analysis. Furthermore, in the estimation of the prot elasticity, every
variable is redened as the log deviations from the benchmark rm. For each
industry, the benchmark rm is selected to be the median of the rm level pro-
ductivity vector that is constructed by averaging the idiosyncratic productivity
values over time. For the time-invariant measure, we regress the relative prof-
its on the relative e¢ ciency by using the standard xed e¤ects estimator. We
keep the same notation used in the previous parts and refer the elasticity of the
prots to the productivity as TPE and the elasticity to the unit cost (variable
costs to revenue ratio) as EPE.
It is worth nothing that the method of measuring the competition with the
prot elasticity does not require to use all the rms in the sample, as long as the
sample covers the same rms in all periods, while PCM necessitates considering
all the units that have a positive market share. Accordingly, in the estimation of
the prot elasticity with both e¢ ciency measures, we remove the rms with non-
positive prots from the sample, so that we are able to express the dependent
variable in logarithms. Moreover, we extract the rms for which there are gaps
in the data that may be due to the entry and exit. Thus, the estimation sample
covers only the rms that operate for all years in the regarding industries.
The rm level PCM is retrieved through the following formula.
pcmit =
materialsit + payrollit   depreciationit + uext  Capitalit
salesit
(25)
In the above identity, all the variables are in the nominal terms and the
ex-post user cost of capital (uext ) is calculated by the following formula.
uext =

rt   Kt   
 
1 + Kt

PKt (26)
Therefore, PKt stands for the price of the capital, and rt represents the op-
portunity cost of the capital for which we use the interbank prime rate that is
the weighted average of all the instruments. The ination rate of the capital
goods and services
 
Kt

is calculated by the weighted average of the producers
price indices of the manufacturing industries that are classied to produce cap-
ital goods and services8 . Lastly, the industry level PCM is calculated as the
average of the rm level PCMs weighted by the revenue share of the rm in
the industry.
8A derivation for the user cost of capital identity and the list of industries used in the
calculation of Kt can be found in the appendix part.
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Figure VII: Competition Indices
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Figure VIII displays the time invariant competition measures and the esti-
mated elasticity of substitution () at the industry level. The estimated prot
elasticity values with the both e¢ ciency measures are signicant at 1% level
for all the listed industries. It is also worth noting that all the competition
measures reported in this paper are arranged in a way that the higher values
correspond to the higher level of competition, so that EPE is minus one times
the estimated elasticity of the prots to the unit costs, while PCM represents
the ratio of the total input expenditures over the nominal sales that is expected
to approach one as competition intensies.
Following the discussion developed in the theoretical part, we consider the
industry level substitution elasticity as the benchmark indicator of the inten-
sity of interaction among the rms. Accordingly, the rst row of Figure VIII
shows that the distribution of the estimated TPEs is quite similar to that of
the substitution elasticity for the 13 Ukrainian manufacturing industries. The
di¤erences in the industry rankings of TPE and  are only observed for the
industries that exhibit similar levels of competitiveness. Therefore, if we group
the industries according to the measured levels of competition, for both  and
TPE, the sectors DA, DG and DI constitutes the most competitive group,
where DB, DC,DF and DN are observed to be the industries that exhibit
lowest intensity of interaction among the rms.
However, EPE draws a somewhat di¤erent picture where the degree of com-
petition seems to be overestimated especially for the sectors that have a lower
level of substitution elasticity. The sectors that are measured to have relatively
low level of competition in terms of  and TPE, such as the industries DC,
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DD, DH and DK, are among the most competitive group according to EPE.
However, the most competitive ones in terms of TPE and , such as DA, DG
and DI still exhibit high intensity of competition when it is measured by EPE.
On the other hand, Figure VIII does not provide a seemingly signicant
correlation between PCM and any other competition indices. PCM indicates
a lower industry level heterogeneity in the competition intensity, so that it is
hard to distinguish the most and the least competitive groups. The sectors
DG and DI, which are among the most competitive industries according to
the other indicators, are ranked as the two least competitive industries with
respect to PCM . Furthermore, DN and DC, that are in the group of least
competitive industries in terms of  and TPE, are observed to indicate the
highest level of competition according to PCM: Therefore, for the Ukrainian
manufacturing sector, we consider PCM to be the possibly most divergent
measure of competition among the indices listed in the graph.
So far the ndings are in line with our theoretical discussion that when the
intensity of interaction among rms is low in an industry, EPE gives distorted
results and can even be negatively correlated with the true intensity of compe-
tition. PCM also performs poor in the case of lower competition, but it is more
sensitive to the frictions such as xed operational costs, which can explain the
deviation of PCM from the other three measures of competition. Our results
further support TPE as the robust indicator of the competition intensity that
exhibits a higher degree of correlation with the estimated substitution elasticity.
However, empirical researchers often need to measure the level of competi-
tion at a point in time where our production function estimation methodology
does not allow us to estimate the time variation in the substitution elasticity.
This is also a practical reason for why it is often preferred simpler methods to
analyze the time trend in the competition. Therefore, following discussion takes
into account the time dimension in the measurement of competition with the
three abovementioned empirical indices. While doing so we estimate the prot
elasticity by OLS across the rms in a given year. We use the same sample
of rms as in the previous part so that all the rms used in the estimation of
the prot elasticity fully operate during the 4-year period. We further extend
the analysis by introducing the industry level TFP and the labor productivity.
Appendix Table IV presents the summary statistics on the calculated measures
of competition used in this part of the analysis.
Table II Partial Corr. Matrix of Competition Indices (full sample)
TPE EPE PCM Av: TFP Av: LP
TPE 1 -0.016 0.176 0.479* 0.181
EPE -0.016 1 -0.046 0.032 0.075
PCM 0.176 -0.046 1 0.093 -0.244
Av: TFP 0.479* 0.032 0.093 1 -0.224
Av: LP 0.181 0.075 -0.243 -0.224 1
* Signicant at 5% level.
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Table II displays the partial correlation coe¢ cients among the industry level
measures of the competition and productivity where the industry xed e¤ects are
assumed to be exogenous. Therefore, when we consider all 13 industries, there is
a negative and insignicant correlation between TPE and EPE: The correlation
between TPE and PCM is positive but insignicantly low. Moreover, TPE
is positively and signicantly correlated with the industry level TFP, but the
correlation with the labor productivity is insignicant.
The reported partial correlations between EPE and the two productivity
measures are close to 0 indicating that the elasticity measured by EPE does
not seem to be signicantly related with the industry level productivity dy-
namics. Moreover, the correlation of PCM with TFP is also not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, while the correlation of PCM with the labor productivity
is insignicantly negative.
Table III P. Corr. Matrix of Competition In. (for industries > 2)
TPE EPE PCM Av: TFP Av: LP
TPE 1 0.396* 0.222 0.488* -0.124
EPE 0.396* 1 -0.161 0.239 0.142
PCM 0.222 -0.161 1 0.103 -0.258
Av: TFP 0.488* 0.239 0.103 1 -0.25
Av: LP -0.124 0.142 -0.258 -0.25 1
* Signicant at 5% level.
Table III presents the partial correlation matrix for the group of industries
that exhibit more intense within-indusry competition. We categorize the indus-
tries according to the values of the estimated substitution elasticity, so that the
more competitive group includes the industries that have a substitution elas-
ticity higher than 2. It is worth mentioning that the benchmark value for the
elasticity is chosen to satisfy the number of observations to be high enough to
calculate the correlation coe¢ cients.
Accordingly, there is a positive and signicant correlation between TPE and
EPE for the group of industries where the intensity of the interaction among
the rms is relatively high. Moreover, the correlations between EPE and the
two productivity measures also rise for the restricted group, but no signicant
correlation is detected between EPE and any of the productivity indices.
The partial correlation between TPE and PCM is calculated to be higher
than the correaltion for the full sample, but it is still insignicantly low. How-
ever, the values of the correlation coe¢ cients reported for PCM against the
two productivity indices seem to be persistent whatever the sample is restricted
or not. Therefore, the mechanism behind the relationship between the actual
intensity of competition and PCM is possibly more sensitive to the other fac-
tors like the entry and operational costs, while EPE approaches to the true
intensity of competition as the interaction among the rms intensies.
As the potentially robust measure of competition, TPE exhibits the same
degree of correlation with TFP for the restricted and the full sample, but it
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is still not signicantly correlated with the labor productivity. Moreover, the
insignicantly negative correlation between TFP and the labor productivity is
persistent for alternative sample selections. We attribute this to the rm level
price e¤ects embodied in the productivity indices that are important enough to
deteriorate the quality of the index even for the industries where the interaction
among the rms is relatively more intensive.
4 Conclusion
Recently, in almost any eld of economics, the empirical measures of compe-
tition are widely used with the aim of understanding the relationship between
competition and main economic indicators. In particular, the price-cost mar-
gin, the market-concentration based ratios and the prot elasticity are among
the widely used indices of competition, where one can possibly obtain di¤erent
results from the empirical application of these alternative methods for the same
industry and time period. This is mainly due to the inconsistency between the
concept of competition or the theoretical setup underlying the measurement
method and the structure of empirically observed industry dynamics.
This paper considers competition as the intensity of interaction among the
rms in the product market that is mainly determined by the substitutability
among the product varieties in an industry. Therefore, the rst part of this
study investigates the relationship between the foremost competition indices
and the substitution elasticity in a model of monopolistic competition where
each rm draws an idiosyncratic productivity from a continuous distribution
in the entry phase, and produces a single variety under the presence of xed
operational costs.
The theoretical ndings show that, in the steady state, the price-cost margin
is negatively correlated with the competition when the substitution elasticity is
relatively low. This is mainly due to the presence of the operational costs that
restricts the possible increase in the number of new varieties and facilitates
exit, while the industry size expands due to more intense interaction among the
production units. Therefore, the incumbent rms that are productive enough
to stay in the market expand their market share and enhance the protability,
so that price-cost margin decreases with higher degree of substitutability among
the product varieties.
Moreover, when the total expenditure on the inputs to revenue ratio is used
as an e¢ ciency measure, the elasticity of prots to e¢ ciency is also negatively
correlated with the elasticity of substitution for relatively low degrees of sub-
stitutability. However, the elasticity of prots to productivity is monotonically
increasing in the true intensity of competition for alternative parameter settings
considered in the calibration analysis. The di¤erence between the two alterna-
tive measures of the prot elasticity stems from the e¢ ciency measures used in
the calculation. Therefore, the costs to revenue ratio, which is the e¢ ciency
measure of the traditional method, involves price e¤ects in the form of markups
that are sensitive to changes in the substitutability. However, the productivity
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as an exogenous parameter in the theoretical model provides a robust measure of
rm level e¢ ciency that further eliminates the bias in the traditional empirical
measure of prot elasticity.
In line with the predictions of the theoretical analysis, the empirical part
aims to estimate a robust productivity index that is adjusted for the indus-
try markups and compares the performances of the competition measures by
considering the elasticity of substitution as the benchmark determinant of the
intensity of interaction in the product market. While doing so, we utilize a
panel of the manufacturing rms operating in Ukraine. However, we do not ob-
serve the prices at the rm level which necessitates introducing the demand side
into the structural estimation of the production functions to retrieve a markup
estimate. Therefore, the production function parameters are estimated for 14
Ukrainian manufacturing industries by controlling for both the endogeneity of
inputs to productivity and the unobserved prices up to the degree of a constant
industry markup.
The empirical ndings imply that when the total factor productivity is esti-
mated by taking account of the price variations at the rm level, the productivity
is more dispersed in the sectors where the degree of interaction among rms is
low. Namely, our results support the argument that competition leads the con-
vergence in the productivity levels of rms, possibly due to the well-functioning
of the creative destruction process that clears the market from the least e¢ cient
rms and motivates more productive potential entrants to enter. Moreover, in
the sectors where the level of competition is relatively low, the dispersion of the
estimated productivity index is much higher than the dispersion in the standard
labor productivity that is based on the revenue per working hours adjusted by
an aggregate price index. This result is in line with our theoretical predictions
that the rm level prices are negatively correlated with the actual productivity,
so that one would expect a productivity index that involves signicant price
e¤ects to be less dispersed than the actual productivity.
The analysis of the comparative performances of the competition measures
concludes that the traditional prot elasticity overestimates the level of compe-
tition in the industries where the estimated elasticity of substitution is relatively
low. However, for the industries that exhibit intensive rm-to-rm interaction,
the traditional prot elasticity tends to be positively correlated with the sub-
stitution elasticity. On the other hand, the modied measure of the prot
elasticity, which is based on TFP, exhibits strong correlation with the elasticity
of substitution. Moreover, the two prot elasticity measures are signicantly
correlated in the highly competitive industries, while no signicant correlated
is detected for the full sample. Besides, its correlation with the proposed mea-
sure of prot elasticity rises for the sample of highly competitive industries, the
price-cost margin does not exhibit any signicant relationship with none of the
other measures of competition considered in this paper.
This paper sheds light on the use of competition indices in the analysis of
the market dynamics, productivity and growth by arguing that the traditional
methods do not always indicate the true nature of the intensity of interaction
among the establishments in the product market. In particular, our results
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provide an alternative explanation for the recent empirical support on the non-
linear relationship between the traditional measures of competition and produc-
tivity, where we nd either non-linear or insignicant relationship between the
actual level of competition and some of the widely used empirical measures of
competition.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition1. Firm prots are monotonically increasing in .
By using the factor share identity (eq.15), rm level prots as a function
of productivity can be written in the following form where, as before, ri (i) =
pi (i) qi (i) is the rm revenues and the mark-up term is  =

   1 .
i (i) = ri (i)

1  


   (A.1)
Therefore, the rst derivative of the revenue function with respect to pro-
ductivity would be su¢ cient to calculate the rst derivative of prot function.
By substituting rm level price (obtained from eq. 5) and labor demand (eq.8)
identities into the revenue equation, the function can be written as follows.
ri = A
1
 
i (A.2)
A =
24 Y
N
 1
 1
P


W
35
1
 
(A.3)
Where A is a function of industry level variables that are assumed to be
independent of rms productivity draw. Moreover, A can take only positive
35
values, since W , N , P , Y , N and  > 0. Therefore, the rst derivative of ri (i)
can be expressed as follows.
@ri
@i
= A

1
   


1
  1
i (A.4)
Therefore, for any positive and nite value of , the following derivative
proves the positive relationship between prots and productivity for  > 1 and
 > 0.
@i
@i
=
1

A
1
  1
i > 0 (A.5)
Proof of Proposition 2. When  = 0, the elasticity of relative prots to
relative productivity is increasing as the substitution elasticity rises.
When  = 0, the elasticity of relative prots to relative productivity (e;)
can be given by the below formula where rm j is assumed to be the benchmark
rm in the industry.
e; =
@ (i=j)
@ (i=j)
i=j
i=j
=
1
    (A.6)
Therefore, the rst derivative of the elasticity with respect to the elasticity
of substitution is positive for  > 1 and  6= .
@e;
@
=

1
(   ) (   1)
2
> 0 (A.7)
Appendix Table I. Description of Industry Codes
I. Code Description
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products
DE Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing
DF Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel
DG Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made bres
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment
DM Manufacture of transport equipment
DN Manufacturing n.e.c.
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Appendix Table II. Basic Statistics on the Variables used in the Production Function Estimation (Price Adjusted)
Revenue Materials Labor Capital #rms
mean std. mean std. mean std. mean std.
DA 11654.0 48148.1 9223.1 34949.7 199974.2 450053.1 12370.8 78241.2 5598
DB 1791.6 6376.0 947.4 4493.0 133760.4 325081.5 2653.3 9931.1 2131
DC 5339.8 18777.1 3342.9 13095.3 138014.3 288659.4 3715.8 12037.8 377
DD 1056.3 6801.4 827.5 6110.1 50883.1 139671.4 1765.3 8884.1 2464
DE 2209.8 17428.1 1334.3 10526.2 45274.5 185642.2 2993.5 33656.7 4814
DF 201789.3 656273.1 350432.0 1252932.8 1230757.6 3532020.3 225433.6 1138618.8 132
DG 15935.3 93104.0 13020.9 75294.4 270367.5 1259210.4 25224.1 162517.4 1026
DH 4460.2 25563.4 3451.2 19535.1 89155.6 421337.9 5514.4 36037.9 1696
DI 3720.2 10864.3 3070.4 9499.4 135421.4 319218.8 5779.6 22997.7 2409
DJ 28785.0 322234.8 30319.1 326123.8 360760.0 3770655.3 24736.1 285845.8 3296
DK 3080.4 9545.2 2097.7 7543.2 119223.6 308423.9 3320.1 13455.1 3838
DL 5416.2 30057.5 3739.3 20709.2 131206.6 502733.4 5636.0 27677.4 2439
DM 14388.3 168774.0 10553.4 138770.9 328232.6 1813556.6 10641.1 75896.5 1914
DN 2786.4 12181.4 2940.0 14016.9 83625.4 213615.5 2696.1 11499.5 2500
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Appendix Table III. Production Function Estimations
Industry Elasticity Labor Materials Capital #obs.
(1=) (L) (M ) (K)
DA
0.11
(0.02)
0.2
(0.01)
0.63
(0.12)
0.13
(0.02)
16872
DB
0.79
(0.04)
0.48
(0.01)
0.48
(0.09)
0.22
(0.03)
6148
DC
0.47
(0.06)
0.46
(0.03)
0.40
(0.13)
0.15
(0.08)
1056
DD
0.39
(0.05)
0.33
(0.01)
0.74
0.09)
0.11
(0.03)
6621
DE
0.46
(0.02)
0.33
(0.01)
0.39
(0.09)
0.22
(0.06)
14951
DF
0.68
(0.23)
0.10
(0.04)
0.58
(0.22)
0.36
(0.18)
338
DG
0.10
(0.05)
0.21
(0.02)
0.11
(0.20)
0.11
(0.09)
3149
DH
0.38
(0.05)
0.23
(0.01)
0.86
(0.06)
0.11
(0.03)
4876
DI
0.11
(0.03)
0.26
(0.10)
0.64
(0.10)
0.09
(0.02)
7036
DJ
-0.12
(0.05)
0.26
(0.01)
0.18
(0.02)
0.53
(0.14)
8796
DK
0.43
(0.04)
0.34
(0.01)
0.51
(0.06)
0.10
(0.03)
10852
DL
0.26
(0.03)
0.31
(0.01)
0.59
(0.03)
0.08
(0.02)
6844
DM
0.39
(0.04)
0.37
(0.02)
0.47
(0.07)
0.13
(0.03)
5504
DN
0.86
(0.03)
0.32
(0.01)
0.19
(0.10)
0.36
(0.05)
6822
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Appendix Table IV. Basic Statisitcs on Time Variant Competition Measures
Mean Std. Max. Min.
PCM 0.73 0.09 0.86 0.49
TPE 0.88 1.23 3.75 -1.4
EPE 0.63 1.45 4.50 -5.96
Av. TFP 0.24 0.63 2.88 1.e-16
Av. LP 0.09 0.11 0.49 0.01
User Cost of Capital
The purchase price of a capital input is a component of not only the current
period cost but also future periodsuntil the capital good is scrapped or sold.
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Therefore, in order to retrieve rm level prots, one needs a variable that reects
per-period price of capital that we call the ex-post user cost (uext ). The user cost
can be given by the following identity.
uext = Pt (1 + rt)  Put+1 (A.8)
Therefore, Pt is the purchase price of new capital in the beginning of period t
where Put+1 is the price of used capital good at the end of period t. rt represents
the opportunity cost of nancial capital in the beginning of period t.
Assuming a constant depreciation rate () for the industry, the ratio of the
end-period prices of new to used capital goods satises the following identity.
(1  ) = Put+1=Pt+1 (A.9)
We further dene the below identity for the ination rate of the prices of
capital goods
 
Kt

.  
1 + Kt

= Pt+1=Pt (A.10)
Then, we can rewrite the ex-post user cost equation as follows.
uext =

rt   Kt   
 
1 + Kt

Pt (A.11)
For the opportunity cost of capital, rt, we use the interbank prime rate that
is the weighted average of all instruments. Kt and Pt are calculated by the
weighted average of the producersprice indices of the industries with a two
digit SIC code between 23-35 that are listed in Appendix Table V.
Appendix Table V. Industries Used in the Construction of Capital Prices
Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and computers
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Manufacture of other transport equipment
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